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In re American Express Merchants' Litigation*
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2010 the United States Supreme Court vacated the Second
Circuit's decision holding that a mandatory class action waiver contained in
the American Express Company's Card acceptance agreement with its
merchants was unenforceable,1 and remanded for further consideration in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in Stolt-Nielsen.2 On remand, the
Second Circuit found that its original analysis and conclusion were
unaffected by Stolt-Nielsen, and once again held that the mandatory class
action waiver was unenforceable against Amex's merchants because the
waiver "effectively strip[ped] plaintiffs of their ability to prosecute alleged
antitrust violations." 3 More important, the Court found that Stolt-Nielsen
does not stand for the proposition "that a contractual clause barring class
arbitration is per se enforceable." 4 Thus, despite the Court's careful
reconsideration, there remains uncertainty regarding the enforceability of
class action waivers-it is still determined on a case-by-case basis in which
courts balance the benefits of class actions with a federal policy favoring
arbitration.5 As Amex has petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, close
attention should be paid to whether the Supreme Court will affirm the
Second Circuit's decision or set new precedent on class action waivers.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
The named plaintiffs in this class are divided into two groups: (1)
California and New York corporations that operate businesses that have
contracted with American Express ("Amex") to accept their payment card
products; and (2) the National Supermarkets Association, Inc. ("NSA").6 The
class itself is comprised of "all merchants that have accepted American
* In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011).
In re American Express Litigation, 554 F.3d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 2009).
2 Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 599 U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 1758
(2010).
3 Amex, 634 F.3d at 194.
4 Amex, 634 F.3d at 193.
5 Id. at 199.
6 Amex, 554 F.3d at 305.
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Express charge cards (including the American Express corporate card), and
have thus been forced to agree to accept American Express credit and debit
cards, during the longest period of time permitted by the applicable statute of
limitations ... throughout the United States."7 The basic contractual
relationship between Amex and the plaintiffs is set forth in the Card
Acceptance Agreement ("the Agreement").8 Since 1999, the Agreement has
contained a mandatory arbitration clause. 9
The plaintiffs' substantive dispute with Amex centers on the "Honor All
Cards" provision in the Agreement.10 Amex charged merchants higher
"merchant discount fees" for its traditional charge cards. Over the past
decade, Amex developed a variety of new debit and credit card products-
and although these products produced a lower sale-per-transaction rate,
Amex nevertheless charged its merchants the same high discount rate as it
did for its traditional charge cards. The merchants were obligated to accept
these new card products because of the "Honor All Cards" provision. Thus,
the plaintiffs assert that due to this provision, they are forced either to pay
"supracompetitive" merchant discount fees or to stop accepting Amex
products, which would significantly decrease their sales. 1' As a result, the
plaintiffss brought suit claiming that the Agreement amounts to an "illegal
tying arrangement" in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.12
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 306.
10 "[The Agreement applies] to your acceptance of American Express© Cards ...
American Express Card(s) ... shall mean any card or other account access device issued
by American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., or its subsidiaries or
affiliates or its or their licensees bearing the American Express name or an American
Express trademark, service mark or logo." Id. at 308.
11 Amex, 554 F.3d at 308.
12 "The Supreme Court has defined a tying arrangement as 'an agreement by a party
to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or
tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier.' A tying arrangement will violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act if 'the seller has
appreciable economic power in the tying product market and if the arrangement affects a
substantial volume of commerce in the tied market.' (internal quotation marks omitted)."
Id. at 308 n.6 (quoting Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992)).
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B. Procedural History
After the plaintiff merchants filed their class action antitrust suit, Amex
filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration
provision in the Agreement.13 The district court granted Amex's motion,
finding that because the mandatory arbitration provision was
"paradigmatically broad" it applied to the dispute between the parties.14 The
district court also found that the enforceability of the arbitration clause was
for the arbitrator to decide. As a result, plaintiffs substantive antitrust claim
was dismissed.' 5
The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, which reversed the district
court on both grounds, finding that (a) the enforceability of the arbitration
provision was a matter for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide, and (b) the
arbitration provision in the Agreement was unenforceable under Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph.16
Amex subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated the
Second Circuit's decision, and remanded the case for further consideration in
light of its holding in Stolt-Nielsen.17 The Second Circuit was then tasked
with determining whether Stolt-Nielsen altered the Court's original analysis
regarding the enforceability of the arbitration clause in the Agreement.' 8
III. THE STOLT-NIELSEN PRECEDENT
In Stolt-Nielsen, shipping company customers, including AnimalFeeds,
brought suit against Stolt-Nielsen for illegal price fixing.' 9 Although the
parties were required to arbitrate their antitrust dispute, AnimalFeeds
demanded class arbitration.20 Because the arbitration clause was silent on the
13 Amex, 554 F.3d at 308.
14 Amex, 634 F.3d at 191.
15 Id.
16 Id. ("[W]hen a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground
that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing
the likelihood of incurring such costs.") (quoting Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2d Cir. 2000)).
17 Amex, 634 F.3d at 192.
18 Id.
19 See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764-65.
20 Id. at 1765.
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issue of class arbitration, the parties submitted AnimalFeed's demand to the
arbitration panel to decide whether class arbitration was permitted.21 The
panel concluded that in light of expert testimony, the Supreme Court's
decision in Green Tree, and policy considerations, the arbitration clause
permitted class arbitration.22
Stolt-Nielsen appealed the panel's decision to the district court, which
vacated the decision and concluded that the clause precluded class
arbitration. 23 The Second Circuit then reversed on the narrow grounds that
the panel's decision was not made in "manifest disregard" of the law, and
thus the district court should have affirmed the decision.24
The Supreme Court later reversed, finding that "a party may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so." 25 Since the
parties had stipulated that there was no agreement on the issue of class
arbitration, the Court held that "it follows that the parties cannot be
compelled to submit their dispute to class arbitration." 26
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The Second Circuit on reconsideration held that Stolt-Nielsen did not
affect its original analysis in which it found the class action waiver contained
in the agreement between Amex and its merchants unenforceable.27
Specifically, the Court found that where Stolt-Nielsen held that parties cannot
be forced into class arbitration absent a contractual agreement, the
appropriate focus in this case was "not on whether the plaintiffs' contract
provides for class arbitration, but on whether the class action waiver is
enforceable when it would effectively strip plaintiffs of their ability to
prosecute alleged antitrust violations."28
21 Id. at 1765-66.
22 Amex, 634 F.3d at 192-93.
23 Id. at 193.
24 Id
25 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (emphasis in original).
26 Id. at 1776.
2 7 Amex, 634 F.3d at 189.
28 Id. at 193-94.
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A: Stolt-Nielsen Did Not Hold That Contractual Clauses Barring
Class Arbitration Are Per Se Enforceable
As the Supreme Court explained in Stolt-Nielsen, "the foundational FAA
principle [is] that arbitration is a matter of consent."29 Hence, a party could
not be compelled to submit to arbitration unless there was a contractual basis
upon which a court could conclude that the party agreed to arbitration. 30 In
light of Stolt-Nielsen, Amex claimed that the opposite was true: its merchants
must be compelled to submit to individual arbitration because the Agreement
specifically waived class action lawsuits. 31 Additionally, Amex argued that
Stolt-Nielsen rejected the use of public policy as a basis for finding
arbitration agreement language void.32
The Second Circuit rejected both of Amex's arguments. First, the court
noted that Stolt-Nielsen simply stands for the principle that parties cannot be
forced to arbitrate unless they contractually agreed to do so. 33 Second, the
court found that although Stolt-Nielsen "plainly rejects using public policy as
a means for divining the parties' intent," the case did not bar courts from
"using public policy to find contractual language void."34 Thus, the Second
Circuit's reconsideration of the effect of Stolt-Nielsen on its original analysis
was simple and straightforward: it had no effect.35
29 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
30 Id
31 Amex, 634 F.3d at 190-91.
32 Id. at 199. Interestingly, Amex's argument here ignored the plain language of the
savings clause of Section 2 of the FAA which provides that an agreement to arbitrate
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). A contractual
term is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if the interest in its enforcement is
clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of the term. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
33 Amex, 634 F.3d at 193.
34 Id. at 199.
35 Id. at 199. According to the Second Circuit the only effect Stolt-Nielsen had on
the case was in the type of relief the the Court could have ordered because Stolt-Nielsen
"plainly preclude[d] [the Court] from ordering class-wide arbitration." Id. at 200. As the
court noted, however, it did not order class-wide arbitration in its original decision;
hence, the type of relief ordered was a non-issue on reconsideration. Id.
715
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
B. Amex's Class Action Waiver Provision Is Unenforceable
Because It Precludes Merchant-Plaintiffs From Enforcing Their
Statutory Rights
Once the Second Circuit determined that Stolt-Nielsen had no effect on
its original analysis, the court proceeded to rearticulate its reasons for finding
the class action waiver at issue unenforceable. As the court explained, its
evaluation of the enforceability of class action waivers is done "under the
federal substantive law of arbitrability." 36 Part of that substantive law is a
"vindication of statutory rights" analysis, which is the test the Second Circuit
applied to the class action waiver contained in the Agreement. 37
Under the statutory rights analysis, the Second Circuit first explained the
unique role of the class action as a "vehicle" for vindicating statutory rights:
[T]he class action device is the only economically rational
alternative when a large group of individuals or entities has
suffered an alleged wrong, but the damages due to any single
individual or entity are too small to justify brining an individual
action. 38
The Second Circuit then focused on the issue of whether the mandatory
class action waiver contained in the Agreement had the practical effect of
precluding the Plaintiffs from bringing their antitrust claims in either an
individual or collective capacity. 39 Thus, for example, if the costs of
arbitration were prohibitively expensive for an individual party, a class action
waiver may be unenforceable under the statutory rights analysis.40
However, the burden of proving prohibitive costs is on the party seeking
to invalidate an arbitration agreement, and to carry that burden it must do
more than speculate that it will incur prohibitive costs. 41 The most effective
way for a party to invalidate an arbitration agreement on prohibitive-cost
grounds is to produce expert testimony on the economic feasibility of
36 Amex, 634 F.3d at 194. -
37 Id. See also Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2006).
38 Amex, 634 F.3d at 194 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161
(1974)).
39 Amex, 634 F.3d at 196.
40 Id. at 196-97.
41 Id. at 196.
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pursuing a statutory claim individually or collectively-which is precisely
what the merchant-plaintiffs did in this case.
Based on plaintiffs' expert report, the Second Circuit concluded that "the
only economically feasible means for enforcing their statutory rights is via a
class action." 42 Furthermore, Amex offered no challenge to plaintiffs'
feasibility claim. Thus, the court held as a matter of law that "the cost of
plaintiffs individually arbitrating their dispute with Amex would be
prohibitive, effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the
antitrust laws." 43
V. CONCLUSION AND IMPACT.OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S RULING
The Second Circuit's holding has made one thing very clear: courts
deciding whether a class action waiver is enforceable will be faced with the
difficult task of balancing the necessity of class actions with the "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." 44 It follows, therefore, that
courts can only proceed on a case-by-case basis in evaluating the
enforceability of class action waivers when a statutory right is asserted,
which in turn can only lead to greater uncertainty.
For example, the Second Circuit held that the class action waiver was
unenforceable because it prevented plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory
rights under the antitrust statutes-a result Congress could not have intended
when it included "strong private enforcement mechanisms" in those
statutes.45 However, the court explicitly stated that it did not conclude that
class action waivers in arbitration agreements were per se unenforceable, nor
did it conclude that such waivers were "per se unenforceable in the context of
antitrust actions." 46
Is then the key factor in evaluating the enforceability of class action
waivers persuasive expert testimony on the prohibitiveness of the costs of
pursuing individual arbitration? Clearly, Amex erred in its decision not to
4 2 Id. at 198.
43 Id. at 197-98. The Second Circuit went on to explain that "[e]radicating the
private enforcement component from our antitrust law scheme cannot be what Congress
intended when it included strong private enforcement mechanisms and incentives in the
antitrust statutes." Id. at 199. See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344
(1979).
44 Amex, 634 F.3d at 199 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
45 Amex, 634 F.3d at 199.
46 Id.
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challenge plaintiffs' demonstration that their claims could not "reasonably be
pursued" as individual actions. 47 If it did, however, this case would have
turned into a "battle of the experts" to determine whether plaintiffs could
cost-effectively vindicate their statutory rights through individual
arbitration-law and economics at its finest.48
Going forward, the most important question that remains is how can
companies like American Express structure contractual arbitration clauses so
that courts will enforce the agreement as written? In light of this case, Stolt-
Nielsen, and Section 2 of the FAA, parties simply cannot rely on courts to
enforce their arbitration agreements as written, especially when one party,
such as Amex, uses the same class action waiver in each and every
Agreement with its merchants. Nevertheless, parties committed to having
their class action waivers enforced must now be prepared to spend more
money and other necessary resources on financial and economic experts to
withstand a statutory rights analysis-all in the name of arbitration.
Zachary M Sugarman
47 Id.
48 It might be worth noting here that the only option Amex's merchants had was
individual arbitration or litigation, which.means it is possible that the Second Circuit's
analysis could have been different had the merchant-plaintiffs at least been afforded the
possibility to arbitrate their claims as a class. However, the last thing large corporations
want to do is submit to class-wide arbitration where FED. R. CIv. P. 23 does not exist-
not to mention the standard of review courts apply to an arbitrator's decision.
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